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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants,
)

)
)
)
)
Docket No. C. 3 2 9 7

)
a corporation.
)
)
_________________________________ )

COMPLAINT
Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the
Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a
corporation, has violated the provisions of Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Federal
Trade Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would
be in the public interest, hereby issues this complaint, stating
its charges as follows:

PARAGRAPH ONE: Respondent American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("respondent" or "AICPA") is a corporation
formed pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia.
Respondent is a voluntary association of approximately 264,000
certified public accountants ("CPAs"), who comprise approximately
three-quarters of the CPAs in the United States. Its principal
business office is located at 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New
York, New York 10036-8775.
PARAGRAPH TWO: For purposes of this complaint, the
following definitions shall apply:
A.
"Attest service" means providing (1) any audit, (2) any
review of a financial statement, (3) any compilation of a
financial statement when the certified public accountant ("CPA")
expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use
the compilation and the CPA does not disclose a lack of
independence, and (4) any examination of prospective financial
information;
B.
"Commission" means compensation, except a referral fee,
for recommending or referring any product or service to be
supplied by another person;

C. "Contingent fee" means a fee established for the
performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no
fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is
attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise
dependent upon the finding or result of such service; and
D.
"Referral fee" means compensation for recommending or
referring any service of a CPA to any person.

PARAGRAPH THREE: Except to the extent competition has been
restrained as herein alleged, many of respondent's members in the
practice of public accounting have been and are now in
competition among themselves and with other CPAs.
PARAGRAPH FOUR: Respondent is a corporation organized for
the purpose, among others, of guarding and fostering its members'
economic interests, and is engaged in substantial activities that
further its members' pecuniary interests. As a result of such
purpose and activities, respondent is a "corporation," within the
meaning of Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 44.
PARAGRAPH FIVE: The acts and practices of AICPA, including
those herein alleged, are in commerce or affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
PARAGRAPH SIX: Respondent has agreed, combined or conspired
with its members or other persons, or has acted as a combination
of its members, to restrain competition among CPAs in the United
States by, among other things:

A.
Restricting the methods CPAs may use to set their fees,
including prohibiting the offering or rendering of professional
services for a contingent fee or a commission to a person for
whom the CPA is not also performing attest services. Under these
restrictions, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among other
things, (1) assisting a state government to obtain a Medicare
refund from the United States Government pursuant to a contract
whereby the CPA receives no fee if the state receives no refund,
or (2) assisting a consumer by preparing a financial plan
pursuant to a contract under which the CPA will be compensated by
receiving commissions from the sellers of any products that are
purchased by the consumer;

B.
Restricting truthful, nondeceptive advertising by CPAs,
including, but not limited to:
1.

Self-laudatory or comparative advertising;

2.

Testimonial or endorsement advertising; and
2

3.

Advertising not considered by AICPA to be
professionally dignified or in good taste.

Under these restrictions, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among
other things, truthfully advertising that they are ’’real tax
experts,” that they offer ”the expertise of a large national
firm," or that "John Smith says that their CPA firm was
particularly responsive to his needs.”

C. Restricting solicitation of clients by CPAs, including,
but not limited to, (1) restricting direct solicitation of
potential clients, and (2) prohibiting the payment or acceptance
of referral fees. Under these restrictions, CPAs are or may be
deterred from, among other things, soliciting clients by mail,
paying marketing firms to assist in soliciting potential clients,
and granting discounts to clients for referring other clients to
them; and
D. Restricting the use of nondeceptive trade names by CPAs.
Under this restriction, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among
other things, using names like ”Suburban Computer Services” or
”Smith and Jones, CPAs, Tax Services," even when the name
truthfully reflects the services provided by the CPAs.

PARAGRAPH SEVEN: In furtherance of the agreement, combi
nation, or conspiracy described in PARAGRAPH SIX, AICPA has
promulgated, maintained, and enforced a Code of Professional
Conduct, including, but not limited to, Rules 302, 502, 503 and
505, and Interpretations 502-1 and 502-2 thereof.
PARAGRAPH EIGHT: Respondent’s actions described in
PARAGRAPHS SIX and SEVEN have had, or have the tendency and
capacity to have, the following effects, among others:
A. Restraining competition among CPAs with respect to
price, quality, and other terms of service;

B. Depriving consumers of information about the
availability, price, and quality of CPA services; and
C. Injuring consumers by depriving them of the benefits of
free and open competition among CPAs.
PARAGRAPH NINE: The agreement, combination, or conspiracy
and the acts and practices described above constitute unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts or practices in violation
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45. Such agreement, combination or conspiracy, or
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the effects thereof, is continuing and will continue absent the
entry against respondent of appropriate relief.

WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Federal Trade
Commission, on this twenty-sixth day of July, 1990, issues its
Complaint against the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.

By the Commission.
dissented.

Commissioners Azcuenaga and Owen

Donald S. Clark
Secretary

SEAL
ISSUED:

July 26, 1990
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS:

Janet D. Steiger, Chairman
Terry Calvani
Mary L. Azcuenaga
Andrew J. Strenio, Jr.
Deborah K. Owen

In the Matter of
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants,

)
)
)

)
)
a corporation.
)
)
_____________________________________ )

)

DOCKET NO.c.3297
DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an
investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent
named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been
furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint which
the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission
for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission,
would charge respondent with violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act; and
The respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the
Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a
consent order, an admission by the respondent of all the
jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of
complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for
settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by
respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such
complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the
Commission's rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and
having determined that it had reason to believe that the
respondent has violated the said Act, and that complaint should
issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon
accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement
on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having
duly considered the comments filed thereafter by interested
persons pursuant to § 2.34 of its Rules, and having duly
considered the recommendations of its staff to modify the consent
agreement pursuant to the comments received and the supplemental
letter agreement executed by the respondent's counsel, now in
further conformity with the procedure prescribed in § 2.34 of its

Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the
following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order,
as modified:

1. Respondent American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants is a corporation organized, existing and doing
business under and by virtue of the laws of the District of
Columbia, with its office and principal place of business located
at 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036-8775.
2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the
subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the
proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER

I.

IT IS ORDERED that for purposes of this order the following
definitions shall apply:

A.
"AICPA" means American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and its Board of Directors, Council, committees, task
forces, officers, representatives, agents, employees, successors,
and assigns;
B.
"Attest service" means providing (1) any audit, (2) any
review of a financial statement, (3) any compilation of a
financial statement when the certified public accountant ("CPA”)
expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use
the compilation and the CPA does not disclose a lack of
independence, and (4) any examination of prospective financial
information;
C.
"Audit" means an examination of financial statements of
a person by a CPA, conducted in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards, to determine whether, in the CPA's
opinion, the statements conform with generally accepted
accounting principles or, if applicable, with another
comprehensive basis of accounting;

D.
"Commission" means compensation, except a referral fee,
for recommending or referring any product or service to be
supplied by another person;

E.
"Compilation of a financial statement" means presenting
in the form of a financial statement information that is the
representation of any other person without the CPA's undertaking
to express any assurance on the statement;
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F.
"Contingent fee” means a fee established for the
performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no
fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is
attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise
dependent upon the finding or result of such service;

G.
"Disciplinary action" means revocation or suspension
of, or refusal to grant, membership, or the imposition of a
reprimand, probation, constructive comment, or any other penalty
or condition;
H.
"Examination of prospective financial information"
means an evaluation by a CPA of (1) a forecast or projection,
(2) the support underlying the assumptions in the forecast or
projection, (3) whether the presentation of the forecast or
projection is in conformity with AICPA presentation guidelines,
and (4) whether the assumptions in the forecast or projection
provide a reasonable basis for the forecast or projection;

I.
"Forecast" means prospective financial statements that
present, to the best of the responsible party’s knowledge and
belief, an entity's expected financial position, results of
operations, and changes in financial position or cash flows that
are based on the responsible party's assumptions reflecting
conditions it expects to exist and the course of action it
expects to take;

J.
"Person" means any natural person, corporation,
partnership, unincorporated association, or other entity;
K.
"Projection" means prospective financial statements
that present, to the best of the responsible party's knowledge
and belief, given one or more hypothetical assumptions, an
entity's expected financial position, results of operations, and
changes in financial position or cash flows that are based on the
responsible party's assumptions reflecting conditions it expects
would exist and the course of action it expects would be taken
given such hypothetical assumptions;

L.
"Referral fee" means compensation for recommending or
referring any service of a CPA to any person;
M.
"Review" means to perform an inquiry and analytical
procedures that permit a CPA to determine whether there is a
reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that there are
no material modifications that should be made to financial
statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or, if applicable, with another
comprehensive basis of accounting; and
N.
"Trade name" means a name used to designate a business
enterprise.
3

II.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AICPA, directly, indirectly, or
through any person or other device, in connection with its
activities in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in
Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall forthwith
cease and desist from:

A.
Restricting, regulating, impeding, declaring unethical,
advising members against, or interfering with any of the
following practices by any CPAs
1.

The offering or rendering of professional services
for, or the receipt of, a contingent fee by a CPA,
provided that AICPA may prohibit the engaging to
render or rendering by a CPA for a contingent fee:
(a) of professional services for, or the receipt
of such a fee from, any person for whom the CPA
also performs attest services, during the period
of the attest services engagement and the period
covered by any historical financial statements
involved in such attest services; and (b) for the
preparation of original or amended tax returns or
claims for tax refunds;

2.

The offering or rendering of professional services
for, or the receipt of, a disclosed commission by
a CPA, provided that the engaging to render or
rendering of professional services by a CPA for a
commission for, or the receipt of a commission
from, any person for whom the CPA also performs
attest services may be prohibited by the AICPA
during the period of the attest services
engagement and the period covered by any
historical financial statements involved in such
attest services;

3.

The payment or acceptance of any disclosed
referral fee;

4.

The solicitation of any potential client by any
means, including direct solicitation;

5.

Advertising, including, but not limited to:

(a)

any self-laudatory or comparative claim;

(b)

any testimonial or endorsement; and

(c)

any advertisement not considered by AICPA to
be professionally dignified or in good taste;
and
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6.

The use of any trade name;

PROVIDED THAT nothing contained in this order shall prohibit
AICPA from formulating, adopting, disseminating, and enforcing
reasonable ethical guidelines governing the conduct of its
members with respect to solicitation, advertising or trade names,
including unsubstantiated representations, that AICPA reasonably
believes would be false or deceptive within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;

B.
Taking or threatening to take formal or informal
disciplinary action, or conducting any investigation or inquiry,
applying standards in violation of this order;
C.
Adopting or maintaining any rule, regulation, interpre
tation, ethical ruling, concept, policy, or course of conduct
that is in violation of this order;
ation
order
order
state

D.
Inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting any associ
of accountants to engage in any act that would violate this
if done by AICPA provided, however, that nothing in this
shall prohibit AICPA from soliciting action by any federal,
or local governmental entity; and

E.
Applying or interpreting any other language contained
in the Code of Professional Conduct or its successors in a manner
that would violate this order;

PROVIDED THAT this order shall not prohibit AICPA from:
(a)

suspending membership in AICPA if:

a member's certificate as a CPA or license or
permit to practice as such or to practice public
accounting is suspended as a disciplinary measure
by any governmental entity;

ii.

a member's registration as an investment adviser
is suspended by the SEC;

iii. a member's registration as a broker-dealer is
suspended by the SEC or by any state agency acting
pursuant to any applicable state law or regulation
relating to the issuance, registration, purchase
or sale of securities; or
iv.

a member is suspended from practicing before the
IRS,
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but any such suspension by AICPA shall terminate upon
reinstatement of any such certificate, license, permit,
registration, or authorization to practice; or
(b)

terminating membership in AICPA if:
i.

a member's certificate as a CPA or license or
permit to practice as such or to practice public
accounting is revoked, withdrawn or cancelled as a
disciplinary measure by any governmental entity;

ii.

a member's registration as an investment adviser
is revoked by the SEC;

iii. a member's registration as a broker-dealer is
revoked by the SEC or by any state agency acting
pursuant to any applicable state law or regulation
relating to the issuance, registration, purchase
or sale of securities;
iv.

a member is subject to a final judgment of
conviction for criminal fraud or for a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
or

v.

a member is disbarred from practicing before the
IRS.

III.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AICPA shall:

A.
Distribute a copy of this order and an announcement in
the form shown in Appendix A, within thirty (30) days after this
order becomes final, to all personnel, agents, or representatives
of AICPA having responsibilities with respect to the subject
matter of this order and secure from each such person a signed
statement acknowledging receipt of this order and said
announcement;
B.
Distribute by mail a copy of this order and an
announcement in the form shown in Appendix A, within thirty (30)
days after this order becomes final, to each of its members and
to each state society of certified public accountants;
C.
Publish this order and an announcement in the form
shown in Appendix A, within sixty (60) days after this order
becomes final, in an issue of the "Journal of Accountancy,"
AICPA's monthly journal, or in any successor publication, in the
same type size normally used for articles which are published in
the "Journal of Accountancy" or in any successor publication;
6

D.
Within ninety (90) days after this order becomes final,
publish and distribute to all members of AICPA and to all
personnel, agents, or representatives of AICPA having responsi
bilities with respect to the subject matter of this order revised
versions of AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct, Bylaws,
concepts of professional ethics, interpretations, ethical
rulings, or other policy statements or guidelines of AICPA which
(1) delete any material that is inconsistent with Part II of this
order and (2) otherwise comply with this order;
E.
File with the Federal Trade Commission within sixty
(60) days after this order becomes final, one (1) year after this
order becomes final, and at such other times as the Federal Trade
Commission may by written notice to AICPA request, a report in
writing setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it
has complied and is complying with this order;
F.
For a period of five (5) years after this order becomes
final, maintain and make available to the Federal Trade
Commission staff for inspection and copying, upon reasonable
notice, records adequate to describe in detail any action taken
in connection with any activity covered by Parts II and III of
this order, including any written communications and any
summaries of oral communications, and any disciplinary action;
and

G.
Notify the Federal Trade Commission at least thirty
(30) days prior to any proposed changes in AICPA, such as
dissolution or reorganization resulting in the emergence of a
successor corporation or association, or any other change in the
corporation or association which may affect compliance
obligations arising out of this order.
By the Commission.

Commissioners Azcuenaga and Owen dissented.

Donald S. Clark
Secretary

SEAL
ISSUED: July 26, 1990
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APPENDIX A
[Date]

ANNOUNCEMENT
As you may be aware, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("AICPA") has entered into a consent agreement
with the Federal Trade Commission that became final on [date].
The order issued pursuant to the consent agreement provides that
AICPA may not interfere if its members wish to engage in any of
the following activities:
(1)

accepting contingent fees from nonattest clients;

(2)

accepting disclosed commissions for products or
services supplied by third parties to nonattest
clients;

(3)

engaging in advertising and solicitation;

(4)

making or accepting disclosed payments for referring
potential clients to a CPA; or

(5)

using trade names.

The order allows AICPA to prohibit its members from
accepting contingent fees for preparing original or amended tax
returns or claims for tax refunds.
The order does not prevent AICPA from formulating reasonable
ethical guidelines prohibiting solicitation, advertising or trade
names that it reasonably believes would be false or deceptive
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.

In particular, without attempting to be all-inclusive, the
agreement between AICPA and the Federal Trade Commission means
that as long as its members do not engage in falsehood or
deception, AICPA cannot prevent or discourage them from engaging
in the following practices, among others:
(a)

in-person solicitation of prospective clients;

(b)

self-laudatory advertising;

(c)

comparative advertising;

(d)

testimonial or endorsement advertising;

(e)

advertising that some members may believe is
"undignified" or lacking in "good taste";

(f)

assisting any state government that is not an attest
client in claiming a Medicare refund pursuant to a
contingent fee contract;

(g)

preparing financial plans for nonattest clients for
which members will be compensated by commissions from
the sellers of products or services that such clients
purchase;

(h)

using trade names, such as "Suburban Tax Services";

(i)

paying referral fees to marketing firms that assist
members in soliciting potential clients; and

(j)

offering clients a discount for referring a prospective
client.

For more specific information, you should refer to the FTC
order itself. A copy of the order is enclosed.

Philip B. Chenok
President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER AZCUENAGA,
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART,
in American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Docket C— 3297

The Commission today accepts a consent order that, among
other things, prevents the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA"), through its Code of Professional Conduct,
from requiring that its members refrain from using coercion,
overreaching or harassment to solicit clients and from requiring
that its members forgo certain fee arrangements that may create
conflicts of interest. The Commission challenges provisions in
the AICPA code that have no anticompetitive effect, that are far
removed from the per se category of legal offenses and for which
AICPA arguably has good reason.
I dissent.
AICPA's rule on solicitation prohibits "the use of coercion,
overreaching or harassing conduct." The rule is not unlawful on
its face, nor is there any evidence that the rule has been used
improperly, much less unlawfully. The majority invalidates the
rule, apparently on the theory that the purpose of the rule is to
discourage all forms of solicitation. The Commission lacks even
the proverbial shred of evidence to support this theory. The
sparse information we have shows instead that AICPA consistently
responds to inquiries about the rule by stating unequivocally
that it does not prohibit all direct, uninvited solicitation, by
advising members to consult the dictionary definitions of
"coercion," "overreaching" and "harassment" for general guidance
and by offering to analyze particular facts relating to a
proposed or questionable solicitation.
AICPA promulgated the rule as an attempt to balance the
concerns of its members about certain kinds of direct, uninvited
solicitation1
2 with the need for a rule that would not offend the
antitrust laws (hardly probative evidence of an unlawful
purpose). AICPA's refusal to interpret the solicitation rule
except in the context of a specific fact situation also stems
from its efforts to comply with the antitrust laws and is not
indicative of an unlawful purpose. The implication of the

1 Some of the provisions in AICPA's Code that the
Commission challenges can be shown to be anticompetitive and
unlawful, and the corresponding remedies imposed by the
Commission are appropriate. I agree with the majority that there
is reason to believe that AICPA's restrictions on contingent fees
(II.A.1) and advertising (II.A.5 and II.A.6) unlawfully restrain
competition.
I dissent from Paragraphs II.A.2, II.A.3 and II.A.4
of the order.
2 Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (state may ban in-person solicitation by lawyers for
profit).

Commission's prohibition is that a professional association may
not, under any circumstances, bar its members from engaging in
coercion, overreaching or harassment. I cannot join in this
unfortunate message.

AICPA has maintained that many of its ethical rules,
including the rules against referral fees and commissions, are
intended to preserve the fact as well as the appearance of
independence and objectivity of its members. This asserted
justification has substantial credibility particularly in the
context of attest services. The Securities and Exchange
Commission prohibits auditors from having joint business
arrangements with their audit clients for this reason, and the
majority itself partly concedes the validity of AICPA's
justification by not challenging AICPA's ban on commissions and
contingent fees for attest clients.
Referral fees and commissions pose the same potential
harm — a conflict between the financial interests of the CPA and
his client. Although consumer search costs may be reduced by
permitting these practices, referral fees and commissions do not
necessarily lead to lower overall costs for consumers. To
further their own economic self-interest, CPAs may refer
consumers for services they otherwise might not recommend, and
any profit-maximizing CPA presumably will pass on the cost of
referral fees to consumers. AICPA's rule against third-party
commissions does not eliminate price competition or restrict the
prices that the CPA charges his or her clients. Instead, the
rule prohibits a method of payment that seems to invite a CPA to
recommend a financial plan that would serve his own financial
interests at least as well as those of his client. See Vogel v.
American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[T]he challenged bylaw does not limit the fee [but] it merely
outlaws a method of fee setting that seems to invite the
appraiser to practice a fraud on his customer . . . .").

One-stop financial service is an option that some consumers
presumably may want. This service, however, is readily available
from other providers and, indeed, from CPAs in those states that
permit CPAs to work on commission.3 CPAs who act as independent
financial advisers, without an economic interest in their own
recommendations, provide a differentiated product in the
financial services market.4 In its haste to endorse the one-stop
3 AICPA is a voluntary association; CPAs who prefer not to
observe AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics need not join.

4 Dean Williams of the University of Southern California
School of Accounting wrote that "[t]he single criterion that sets
CPA firms apart from providers of non-audit services (e.g.,
financial planners, consulting firms, etc.) is the profession's

2

financial service concept, the Commission does not pause to
consider that it is eliminating the ability of AICPA to create a
differentiated service featuring independence and objectivity.

The Commission also does not linger over the possibility
that eliminating AICPA's option to promote this market niche in
connection with non-attest services may have adverse effects in
the market for attest services. We are told that the
independence of CPAs is of critical importance in capital
formation. When the independence of CPAs is compromised by their
involvement with corporate management in non-attest services,
public confidence in their independent auditor function may be
diminished. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission
to Congress On the Accounting Profession and the Commission's
Oversight Role 145-46 (July 1978). If true, this consent order
could harm consumers.
Although there may be value in allowing CPAs to work on
commission and to accept referral fees, the argument that the
Federal Trade Commission is the appropriate institution to
rewrite AICPA's restrictions is substantially less than
compelling, particularly in the face of AICPA's concern with
maintaining the fact and appearance of independence and
objectivity for its members. The Commission does not have the
expertise to make that judgment, and the better and wiser course
is to let the market sort it out.5
This case presents important questions about what
constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The mandate of the Commission is to prevent
unfair methods of competition, not to prescribe particular modes
of competition in the absence of a violation of law. We should
not engage in social engineering under the guise of law
enforcement. AICPA's ethical rules reflect longstanding tenets
of professionalism and could facilitate procompetitive
alternatives in CPA services. The Commission should have
attempted to understand the value of those tenets before changing
the rules by fiat.

ISSUED:

July 26, 1990

reputation for independence and objectivity.
It is in the
public's interest that this reputation be perceived as an
alternative in the market place. Otherwise, third party reliance
on all services, and hence the very essence of capital formation,
will be threatened.** Letter to FTC staff (July 30, 1986).
5 To the extent that state laws may inhibit the use of
commissions and referral fees by CPAs, the Commission's order has
no effect.

3

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER OWEN
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
in American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
File No. 851-0020
Docket C.3297

In the consent order accepted today in this matter, the

Commission prohibits the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA"), by way of its Code of Professional
Conduct, from restricting its members from: (1) adopting certain
referral fee and commission arrangements that may create
conflicts of interest, and (2) using coercion, overreaching or

harassment to solicit clients.

I join Commissioner Azcuenaga in

dissenting from this action.1

The Commission's achievements in protecting the public from
anticompetitive restraints imposed by professional associations

have earned the justified praise of antitrust observers.

These

accomplishments are exemplified by the provisions of this order
governing restrictions on advertising.

The application of

antitrust doctrine in changing times necessarily demands some
imagination on the part of federal law enforcers.

However, this

consent illustrates the dangers of going beyond "pushing the

envelope" with insufficient evidentiary support.

1Along with Commissioner Azcuenaga, I dissent from
Paragraphs II.A.2, II.A.3, and II.A.4 of the order, and concur in
the majority holding that AICPA's restrictions on advertising
(Paragraphs II.A.5 and II.A.6) and certain contingent fees
(Paragraph II.A.1) unlawfully restrain competition.

Referral fees and commissions raise serious potential
conflicts of interest between the CPA and his client, which could
result in damaging financial consequences.

The competitive

effects of prohibiting such fees are not clear — either facially
or in terms of how the prohibitions actually operate — and good

economic evidence as to both is lacking.

There are plausible

efficiency arguments for such restraints, relating both to the

elimination of potentially damaging conflicts of interest, and to
preserving public confidence in the integrity and independence of

members of the AICPA, in both attest and non-attest functions.
The lack of evidence suggesting that these restrictions are

anticompetitive stands in marked contrast to the evidence that
has been compiled in connection with advertising bans,2 and the

plethora of evidence in cases like Detroit Auto Dealers.3
Accordingly, it has not been demonstrated to my satisfaction that

the prohibition of commission and referral fee arrangements by

the AICPA is inherently suspect under the Commission's analysis
in Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C.

541 (1988).

The available evidence as to the market power of the AICPA

is not compelling.

The AICPA is a voluntary association.

2See, e.q., Calvani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, Attorney
Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 761
(1988).

3Docket No. 9189, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶22,653 (Feb. 22,
1989).
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Membership and adherence to its particular Code are not

prerequisites to practice as a CPA.

In states that prohibit CPAs

from accepting referral fees or commissions, today's order has no
effect.

In states without such restrictions, it is hard to

envision any competitive problem; CPAs are free to undertake

actions prohibited by the AICPA ethical standards by simply
leaving the organization.

In addition, CPAs apparently already

face intense competition for non-attest services from non-CPAs,
such as non-CPA accountants, tax preparers, and financial

planners.4

While addressing what may be an illusory competitive

problem, this order opens the door to potentially serious
conflicts of interest, that may cause substantial consumer

injury.

It has been suggested that disclosure of the fee arrangement

itself solves the conflict of interest.

reasons why this may not be true.

There are several

First, the relationship

between the client and the CPA is of a sensitive, fiduciary

nature, in which the trusting client seeks advice in areas where
the client is untutored.

That relationship may color the

client's willingness to accept such a fee arrangement, even after
disclosure, possibly to the client's considerable detriment.

A

client in this situation, because of the trust relationship
4By contrast, CPAs collectively may have substantial market
power for attest services, since only CPAs can offer such
services.
Ironically, the majority correctly recognizes the
efficiency of preventing potential conflicts of interest between
CPAs and clients for attest services.
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involved, might not view such a fee arrangement with the same
skepticism as disclosure of a similar arrangement from another

type of salesman.

In fact, it is entirely possible that the

client does not view the CPA as a salesman at all.

If a CPA

discloses to his regular client that the CPA has received a fee

for referring the client to another CPA for other services, the

client may assume that the fiduciary's motive was to refer him to
the best person for the job.5

That may not be true.

Presumably,

the purpose of the referral fee was to generate the referral,

whether or not made to the best person for the job.

The fact that many consumers seek out a CPA for various non

attest services, rather than alternate service providers,
suggests that the objectivity of the CPA may be a highly

important factor in the decision.

This objectivity legitimately

may be what the AICPA may seek to protect with its ban on

referral fees and commissions.

The ability to identify a

trustworthy, objective service provider through membership in a
professional association would plausibly decrease search costs

and the risk of an adverse experience for consumers.
Regrettably, the order ultimately prevents this alternative; the

overriding benefits resulting from such a restriction are not
clear.

5Referral fees paid to commercial referral services may
present different competitive questions and levels of
efficiencies.
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Second, disclosure of only the fact of a referral fee or
commission may prove insufficient to protect consumers, unless

they are also informed of other relevant information.

For

instance, there might be less expensive alternatives where the
commission would be smaller, but the return to the client might

be the same or greater.

While the Commission's order would

require the CPA to disclose that he would receive a commission,
the CPA would not be required under the order to advise the

client of those other alternatives.

The information that would

have to be disclosed to protect consumers from a conflict of
interest would vary from situation to situation, and does not

seem amenable to listing exhaustively in a Commission order.
However, it does seem that only disclosing the fact that the

commission or referral fee is to be paid is insufficient to
vitiate the conflict of interest.

The benefits claimed for the consent order provisions on
referral fees and commissions do not hold up under close

scrutiny.

For example, it is suggested that consumers now will

be able to do "one-stop shopping," i.e., obtain accounting
services, as well as other financial services, from the same

individual.

This alternative was already available, so long as

an AICPA member did not violate the Code's restrictions on

referral fees and commissions.

Consumers could also obtain

accounting services from a CPA, not a member of the AICPA, and,
in those states that permit it, the CPA could also sell them
5

financial products of any imaginable type, with any fee

arrangement.

Furthermore, with the lifting of the restrictions

on contingent fees for many non-attest services in the instant
order, such a fee alternative would be available for clients who

might have difficulty affording an hourly rate or set fee up
front.

In sum, I have identified several plausible efficiencies
stemming from prohibitions against intra-professional referral

fees and commissions, that seem at least as likely, if not
significantly more likely, to benefit consumers than the proposed
remedy.

Before agreeing to any consent of this nature, I would

need to see more evidence to conclude that prohibiting
restrictions on referral fees and commissions is in the public

interest.

Finally, the AICPA Code prohibits solicitation through "the

use of coercion, overreaching, or harassing conduct."

I concur

in the opinion of Commissioner Azcuenaga that there is no

evidentiary basis for challenging this rule.6

The restriction

is not unlawful on its face, and, if it were demonstrated that it
was enforced in an anticompetitive manner, the appropriate remedy

would be to prohibit that offensive conduct, not the restriction6
Paragraph II.A.4 of the order prohibits the AICPA from
"[r]estricting, regulating, impeding, declaring unethical,
advising members against, or interfering with . . . [t]he
solicitation of any potential client by any means, including
direct solicitation. ..."

6

itself.

This order sends the wrong signal to other organizations

that may wish, and indeed should even be encouraged, to adopt a

legitimate rule of this nature.

ISSUED:

July 26, 1990
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